Jargon alert : Principal-agent problem by Khalid Abdalla
I
magine a firm hires a new employee. His job includes
examining the competing bids from the firm’s suppli-
ers and preparing reports on the merits of each. How
does the firm know the employee will handle this task duti-
fully? It may be easier to simply make up facts than to 
thoroughly research the bids. Or the employee may favor
one supplier over another for reasons completely unrelated
to the merit of the proposal — because of a family con-
nection, for instance. 
This is an example of what economists call the “principal-
agent problem.” In this scenario, the employer is the
“principal” and the employee is the “agent.”
The interests of agents are not perfectly
aligned with those of the principals. Yet the
principals can only imperfectly monitor the
actions of the agents. This means that
agents can advance their own interests at
the expense of those of the principals.
An employer can respond to the agency
problem by increasing the monitoring of
employees. This could be achieved through,
among other things, enhanced manage-
ment scrutiny of employee work. But this
requires a significant investment of the
employer’s time and resources. 
So economists have long pondered less-
costly incentive plans that would align the
interests of employees with those of
employers. The main way of doing that is to
tie employee compensation to the performance of the firm
or a specific metric of that firm’s success or productivity.
One popular policy among publicly listed firms is the
granting of stock options to employees, often upper man-
agement. These stock options are a part of an employee’s
compensation and they rise in value as the firm’s stock rises
in value. This ties the financial well-being of the stock
option recipient directly to that of the firm. 
However, stock options can create their own set of 
perverse incentives. In recent years, some firms have been
scandalized by the practice of “backdating.” Firms that offer
stock options to employees are required to disclose to the
government the date at which the stock option was offered.
This is used to determine the fair market value of the option.
Listing a date that is earlier than the actual date the option
was offered could inflate the value of that form of compen-
sation. Yet, stock options are still widely used by publicly
listed firms — indeed, analysis has shown that they are an
effective way of overcoming the agency problem and 
accompany increases in a firm’s value — although there is
more care paid to their disclosure procedures today.
The link between an individual employee’s effort and the
performance of the company’s stock can be tenuous. Amore
direct way to deal with the agency problem is performance-
based pay. Year-end bonuses are a common form of this sort
of pay system. Another type of performance-based pay is
one when workers are paid a “piece rate” in which they are
compensated per unit of work. For example, vegetable or
fruit pickers might be paid by the number of pounds picked.
The piece rate system can work well for jobs or industries
where the productivity of a worker can be clearly tied to
some unit of final production.
The attempts of firms to ameliorate the
agency problem could also have effects
beyond the walls of the individual firms
themselves. In 1984, economists Carl
Shapiro and future Nobel Prize-winning
economist Joseph E. Stiglitz constructed a
model in which a particular solution to the
principal-agent problem could increase
unemployment. 
In the Shapiro-Stiglitz model, employ-
ers pay workers an above-market wage
called an “efficiency wage” so as to prevent
workers from shirking — that is, slacking
off. The cost to an employee of getting
fired — the lost wages — would be higher,
thereby inducing an employee not to shirk.
Yet, if one firm pays efficiency wages,
then all firms will likely face an incentive to pay efficiency
wages to compete for workers. This would temporarily
remove the incentive to avoid shirking since losing a job 
at one firm wouldn’t necessarily entail a pay cut at an 
alternative job. However, if all firms pay efficiency wages,
then wages will be above the market-clearing level, resulting
in involuntary unemployment. This decreases the chances
that a fired worker will find a replacement job and 
encourages the employee not to shirk. So, in the end, 
efficiency wages serve their goal of mitigating the principal-
agent problem but at the cost of bringing about higher
unemployment.
There are other proposals to align the incentives of work-
ers with employers. One is the use of “seniority wages,”
when workers are initially hired at a rate lower than their
marginal productivity, but see their wages rise as they
demonstrate their value to a company. The type of arrange-
ment that helps solve the principal-agent problem will be
largely determined by a firm’s production processes, and
thus can vary widely across industries.  RF
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